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TIMING IS NOT ON YOUR SIDE
Timing Is Not on Your Side: Missouri Retroactively Limits
Punitive Damages
City of Harrisonville v. McCall Serv. Stations1
Kayla Meine
I. INTRODUCTION
Limitations on punitive damages have led to many constitutional
challenges. While statutory restrictions on punitive damages are generally
upheld as constitutional, there is limited case law regarding the application of
a retroactively enacted punitive damages cap. However, the Missouri
Western District Court of Appeals recently applied a punitive damages cap
retroactively to a cause of action filed after the limitation was in effect, but
accrued before the enactment. The court reasoned that limiting punitive
damages is a procedural, rather than substantive statute; thus, the Missouri
Constitutional provision prohibiting retroactivity of laws did not apply.
Timing was not on the side of the plaintiff. In fact, the plaintiff might
have had better luck in one of the other states that has implemented a punitive
damages cap and held that such limitations are substantive. A closer
examination of the history of Missouri law suggests the distinction between
substantive and procedural is not as simple as the Western District Court of
Appeals made it appear. Part II of this note summarizes the facts, procedural
posture, and holding of the instant case, City of Harrisonville v. McCall Serv.
Stations. Part III explores the legal background of retroactively applying
statutes, including those pertaining to punitive damages. Next, Part IV
describes the majority opinion in McCall and examines the Western District
Court of Appeal’s rationale. Finally, Part V examines the modern trend
among states that have implemented similar statutes limiting punitive
damages and analyzes how the Western District Court of Appeal’s decision
differs from this trend.

1

2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 192 (Mo. App. W.D. Feb. 25, 2014).
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
During construction of a sewer upgrade project in the City of
Harrisonville (“the City”), a contractor for the City discovered that a service
station’s underground storage tank system had been leaking petroleum
products, contaminating the soil. 2 McCall Service Stations (“McCall”)
owned this underground storage tank system until 2000, when it sold the
service station to Fleming Petroleum (“Fleming”). 3 The plaintiff, City of
Harrisonville, brought claims for nuisance and trespass against McCall and
Fleming. 4 Additionally, the City brought claims for fraudulent and negligent
misrepresentation against the Missouri Petroleum Storage Tank Insurance
Fund (“the Fund”).5
The Fund, created in 1989 by the Missouri Legislature, provides
insurance to service station owners for the cleanup costs associated with
spills and leaks from underground petroleum storage tanks.6 In September
1997, McCall discovered its underground gasoline storage tank system was
leaking and contacted the Fund.7 The Fund and McCall had an environmental
engineer investigate the leak, and the engineer determined that the leak
contaminated the soil surrounding McCall’s tank system with petroleum, and
that the contamination had migrated toward a nearby creek on the north side
of the service station.8 The environmental engineer notified the Department
of Natural Resources and was hired by the Fund to monitor the leak.9
Following these events, McCall sold the service station to Fleming in 2000.10
In 2003, the City began constructing a sewer upgrade project.11 As
part of the project, the City planned to install new sewer piping under the
2

City of Harrisonville v. McCall Serv. Stations, No. WD 74429, 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS
192, at *1 (Mo. App. W.D. Feb. 25, 2014).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id. at *2-3.
7
Id. at *2.
8
Bob Fine was hired by the Fund to investigate and monitor the leak. Id. at *3.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id. at *3.
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street adjacent to Fleming’s service station. 12 Additionally, it planned to
install a portion of piping adjacent to a nearby creek.13 The original bid for
the sewer upgrade project was with Rose-Lan Construction (“Rose-Lan”) for
$19,061.31.14 During construction, Rose-Lan encountered soil that was
contaminated by petroleum products.15 The City contacted the Department of
Natural Resources, which informed the City about the Fund hiring an
environmental engineer to monitor the contamination in 1997.16 Per the
City’s request, the Fund hired the same environmental engineer who
determined that the gasoline from the service station was responsible for the
soil contamination in the City’s sewer easement.17
The City and the Fund began discussions about the best way to
complete construction of the sewer upgrade project and to address the
contaminated soil.18 The City’s engineer estimated a cost of more than
$500,000 for the removal and replacement of contaminated soil.19 The Fund
suggested leaving the contaminated soil in place and substituting petroleumresistant pipes as a more cost-effective approach.20 The Fund, through Pat
Vuchetich, an employee of the Fund’s third-party administrator, encouraged
the City to hire Midwest Remediation to install the petroleum-resistant
pipe.21 The bid was for $175,161.41.22 Vuchetich indicated that the Fund
would be responsible for payment of $135,571, which was calculated by
subtracting Rose-Lan’s cost of the relevant section of pipe from the cost of
Midwest Remediation’s work.23

12

Id. at *3-4.
Id. at *4.
14
Id. at *7.
15
Id. at *4.
16
The environmental engineer was Bob Fine. Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. at *4-5.
19
Id. at *5.
20
Id.
21
Original bid to install the petroleum-resistant pipes was made by BV Construction for
$190,226.38. However, Vuchetich decided to encourage the City to hire Midwest
Remediation instead. Id. at *5-6.
22
Id. at *6.
23
Id.
13
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On April 15, 2004, the City held a meeting with all parties.24 During
this meeting, Vuchetich expressed concerns that Rose-Lan’s initial bid was
too low. 25 Rose-Lan subsequently revised the bid upward to $25,138.41.26
This revised bid would effectively reduce the amount the Fund would be
responsible for as contaminated-related costs because the Fund was paying
the City for the costs of Midwest Remediation’s work minus the cost of
Rose-Lan’s bid for constructing the relevant section of piping.27 The City
administrator, City engineer, and the Rose-Lan representative “left the
meeting with the understanding that the Fund wanted the City to hire
Midwest Remediation for the project.” 28 Further, they understood that “the
Fund would reimburse the City for Midwest Remediation’s costs, less the
amount that the City would otherwise have paid Rose-Lan for the affected
portion of the sewer project.”29
Various discussions regarding payment of the project between the
City and the Fund occurred in the following months. 30 On at least two
occasions, Vuchetich offered to settle the Fund’s liability by paying $50,000
to the City.31 However, after the City authorized Rose-Lan to subcontract
with Midwest Remediation, the City’s attorney sent a letter to Vuchetich,
“stating that the City was going forward in reliance on his promise that the
Fund would pay the full amount of Midwest Remediation’s costs.”32
Ultimately, the Fund did not reimburse the City for Midwest Remediation’s
work.33

24

All parties included: Pat Vuchetich, representing the Fund; Dianna Wright, the City
administrator; Ted Martin, the City engineer; Steve Mauer, the City’s attorney; Shaun
Thomas, representing Midwest Remediation; and Willman Rextroat, representing RoseLan Construction. Id. at *7.
25
Id.
26
The original bid for the sewer upgrade project was $19,061.31. Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id. at *7-8.
31
Id. at *8.
32
Letter was written on August 4, 2004. The City’s attorney also made a demand for
payment. Id.
33
Id.
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In November 2005, the City filed suit against the Fund for fraudulent
and negligent misrepresentation.34 It also filed suit against McCall and
Fleming, the former and present service station owners, for nuisance and
trespass.35 The City sought compensatory and punitive damages against all
defendants.36 During a jury trial, the circuit court granted the City’s motion
for a directed verdict on liability regarding the nuisance and trespass claims
against the service station owners.37
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the City on all claims and
awarded the City a total of $172,100.98 in compensatory damages against
McCall, Fleming, and the Fund.38 Further, the jury awarded punitive damages
of $100 against McCall, $100 against Fleming, and $8,000,000 against the
Fund.39 The circuit court entered judgment accordingly.40
McCall, Fleming, and the Fund each filed post-trial motions.41
Among other things, the Fund argued that the punitive damages award
exceeded the cap on punitive damages found in MO. REV. STAT. §
510.265.1(2), which limited punitive damages to “[f]ive times the net amount
of the judgment awarded to the plaintiff against the defendant.”42 The Fund
also argued that the punitive damages award violated the due process
requirements of the United States and Missouri Constitutions.43 The trial
court remitted the punitive damages award to $2,500,000, dismissing the §
510.265.1(2) argument because the City’s cause of action occurred before
2005, when the cap on punitive damages was enacted.44 The trial court
denied all remaining post-trial motions.45 McCall, Fleming, and the Fund
34

Id.
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at *8-9.
38
Id. at *9.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
“No award of punitive damages against any defendant shall exceed the greater of: (1)
Five hundred thousand dollars; or (2) Five times the net amount of the judgment awarded
to the plaintiff against the defendant.” MO. REV. STAT. § 510.265.1 (2000); see also
McCall, 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 192, at *9.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
35
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appealed.46 The City cross-appealed the trial court’s remitter of punitive
damages.47
McCall and Fleming filed a consolidated brief and did not challenge
the trial court’s finding of liability, but instead raised three other points on
appeal.48 In their first point, McCall and Fleming argued that the trial court
erred in submitting the damages instructions on the City’s nuisance and
trespass claims.49 The appellate court denied this argument.50 The appellate
court also denied McCall and Fleming’s second point, holding that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by failing to grant their motions for a
directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.51 Similarly,
the appellate court denied McCall and Fleming’s third point, holding that the
trial court did not err in failing to order remittitur of the jury award of
compensatory damages.52
The Fund raised an additional seven points on appeal.53 The appellate
court denied the first six points, agreeing only with the Fund’s seventh and
final point on appeal that the trial court erred in limiting punitive damages in
accordance with § 510.265.1(2).54 The appellate court denied the Fund’s first
46

Id.
Id.
48
McCall, 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 192, at *10.
49
Id.
50
Id. at *21. The appellate court held that the trial court’s damages instruction did not
misstate Missouri trespass law because “substantive trespass law authorizes the recovery
of consequential damages proximately caused by a trespass.” Id. at *15. The court held
further that the reference to consequential damages was sufficiently definite “to inform he
jury of the legal standard [the jury] was required to apply” and thus did not constitute a
prohibited “roving commission.” Id. at *19.
51
Id. at *21. The testimony of Shaun Thomas, former employee of Midwest
Remediation, relating to the contamination-related costs did not prevent the jury from
crediting the City’s evidence relating to the contamination-related costs; thus, the City
made a “submissible case” and defendants were not entitled to a directed verdict nor a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Id. at *21, *24, *57.
52
Id. at *27. McCall and Fleming argued that the compensatory damages should be
remitted in accordance with Shaun Thomas’s testimony regarding the contaminationrelated costs, but the appellate court found once again that Thomas’s testimony did not
prevent the jury from awarding the City the greater amount sought. Id. at *28.
53
Id. at *28-*57.
54
Id. at *31-*57.
47
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point on appeal because when “the Fund failed to move for a directed verdict
during trial on the basis asserted in its first point, it did not preserve that issue
as a basis for [judgment notwithstanding the verdict], or for appellate
review.”55 The Fund’s second point was also denied, holding that the trial
court did not err in denying the Fund’s motion for a directed verdict because
the City presented substantial evidence to establish that the City relied on
Vuchetich’s representations.56 The appellate court also held that § 319.131.5
did not prevent a judgment against the Fund for compensatory and punitive
damages “based on its own fraud or negligent misrepresentations,” thus
denying the Fund’s third point on appeal.57 In its fourth point, the Fund
argued, and the appellate court denied, that the statements made by
Vuchetich on April 15, 2004, were too vague and uncertain to support a
causes of action for fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation, and the
instructions given to the jury on those claims were impermissible roving
commissions.58 The appellate court also denied the Fund’s fifth point,
holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence
of settlement discussions following the April 15, 2004 meeting between the
City and the Fund.59 The appellate court’s final denial was of the Fund’s sixth
55

Id. at *30-*31. The Fund argued in its first point that the City “could not have actually
or justifiably relied on any statements made by Vuchetich at the April 15, 2004 meeting
that the Fund would indemnify the City for the entirety of Midwest Remediation’s net
costs” because such reliance was prevented by Vuchetich’s later letter offering to settle
the Fund’s liability for $50,000. Id. at *29.
56
Id. at *34-*35. The appellate court reasoned that the City’s submissible case included
evidence that the City relied on the Fund’s representations when it decided to “hire
Midwest Remediation…without a competitive bidding process; and to accept the less
costly alternative of leaving much of the contaminated soil in place, rather than
excavating all of it.” Id. at *34.
57
Id. at *39. “The fund shall not compensate . . . any third party . . . for any loss or
damages of an intangible nature, including . . . punitive damages.” Mo. Rev. Stat. §
319.131.5 (2000).
58
Id. at *40. Evidence that the City Administrator, City Engineer, and Rose-Lan
representative all took Vuchetich’s statements at the meeting to mean the Fund would
pay for all costs incurred by the City if it hired Midwest Remediation, less what RoseLan would have charged made the statements not too vague or uncertain, thus supporting
a cause of action for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation. Id. at *40-*41.
Additionally, the instructions used in the verdict director was not misleading in the
context of the evidence and thus did not involve a roving commission. Id.
59
Id. at *42-*43. The appellate court found that the exclusion of evidence did not
prejudice the Fund because the excluded evidence was “merely additional evidence of the
same kind bearing upon the same point.” Id. at *47-*49 (internal citations omitted).
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point, which argued that the trial court erred in submitting punitive damages
to the jury because there was insufficient evidence of malicious conduct.60
However, the Missouri Western District Court of Appeals agreed with
the Fund’s argument that the trial court erred “by entering judgment against
[the Fund] for punitive damages of $2,500,000, because under §
510.265.1(2), punitive damages are limited to . . . five times the net amount
of the damages awarded to the plaintiff.”61 The court reasoned that §
510.265.1 applied in this case because the legislature specified the cap on
punitive damages would apply to “all causes of action filed after August 28,
2005.”62 The City filed its lawsuit in November of 2005; therefore, the
punitive damages cap is applicable.63
The Western District Court of Appeals thereafter affirmed the trial
court’s judgment, but modified the judgment pursuant to Rule 84.1464 to
reduce the punitive damages awarded against the Fund to $860,504.90,
rejecting the trial court’s refusal to apply § 510.265.1(2).65 Thus, when a
statute limiting punitive damages has an enactment date and a plaintiff files a
cause of action after that enactment date, the statute is applicable even if the
harm relating to the cause of action accrued prior to the day of enactment.

60

Id. at *49-*50. The appellate court held the City had a submissible case for punitive
damages of the evidence because the evidence involved Vuchetich’s encouragement to
hire Midwest Remediation, his advice that Midwest Remediation’s bid was reasonable,
his statements that the Fund would pay, the Fund’s refusal to pay because remedial costs
were too high, the Fund’s continuance on the basis that it was not responsible for
contamination north of the creek, and the unreasonable delay caused by the Fund. Id. at
*49-*56.
61
Id. at *56.
62
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 538.305 (2000) (emphasis added); id. at *57.
63
McCall, 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 192, at *57.
64
“The appellate court shall award a new trial or partial new trial, reverse or affirm the
judgment or order of the trial court, in whole or in part, or give such judgment as the
court ought to give. Unless justice otherwise requires, the court shall dispose finally of
the case.” MO. SUP. CT. R. 84.14.
65
McCall, 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 192, at *70-*71.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Missouri Constitution provides “[t]hat no ex post facto law, no
law impairing the obligation of contract, or retrospective in its operation, or
making any irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities, can be
enacted.”66 Therefore, the general rule is that statutes are not applied
retroactively.67 The two exceptions that would for retroactive application
include: “(1) where the legislature shows an intent that it be applied
retroactive[ly], and (2) where the statute is procedural only and does not
affect any substantive rights of the parties.”68 Therefore, the law is settled on
the fact that the legislature cannot change the “substantive” law for a
category of damages after a cause of action has accrued.69 A substantive law
“relates to rights and duties giving rise to the cause of action, while
procedural statutes supply the machinery used to effect the suit.”70 Stated
another way, “[s]ubstantive laws fix and declare primary rights and remedies
of individuals concerning their person or property, while remedial statutes
affect only the remedy provided, including laws that substitute a new or more
appropriate remedy for the enforcement of an existing right.”71
However, regarding procedural provisions, the law is quite clear that
“[n]o person can claim a vested right in any particular mode of procedure . . .
and where a statute deals only with procedure it applies to all actions,
including those pending or filed in the future.”72 The Fourteenth Amendment
only guarantees a party, “the preservation of his substantial right to redress
by some effective procedure.”73 Thus, the U.S. Constitution does not prevent
a procedural or remedial provision from being applied retroactively.74
The Missouri Supreme Court, in Vaughan v. Taft Broadcasting, Co.,
expressly stated that under Missouri law, “punitive damages are remedial and
66

MO. CONST. ART. I, § 13.
In re Estate of Wilkinson, 843 S.W.2d 377, 382 (Mo. App. E.D. 1992).
68
Id. (emphasis added).
69
Klotz v. St. Anthony’s Med. Ctr., 311 S.W.3d 752, 760 (Mo. 2010).
70
Patrick v. Clark Oil & Ref. Co., 965 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Mo. App. S.D. 1998) (quoting
Stark v. Missouri State Treasurer, 954 S.W.2d 645 (Mo. App. 1997)..
71
Files v. Wetterau, Inc., 998 S.W.2d 95, 97 (Mo. App. E.D. 1999).
72
Scheidegger v. Greene, 451 S.W.2d 135, 137 (Mo. 1970).
73
Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326, 332 (1933).
74
Vaughan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 708 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Mo. 1986).
67
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a plaintiff has no vested right to such damages prior to the entry of
judgment.”75 Further, “the purpose of punitive damages is to inflict
punishment and to serve as an example and deterrent to similar conduct.”76
Rather than to compensate the victim, punitive damages follow a
public policy rationale, which is that punitive damages should be awarded in
some cases in the interest of society.77 Thus, an act barring or limiting
punitive damages “cannot be said to deny any constitutional right.”78 Instead,
punitive damages are awarded wholly within the discretion of the trier of fact
and the remedial nature of punitive damages make them never allowable as a
matter of right.79
However, punitive damages can also be labeled as substantive. In
another Missouri Supreme Court decision, Hess v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
USA, N.A., the court did not allow for a punitive damages statute to be
applied retroactively because it affected a substantive right.80 The court in
Hess stated that because the Missouri Constitution prohibits laws that are
retrospective in operation, the Constitution prohibits a law “if it takes away
or impairs vested or substantial rights acquired under existing laws or
imposes new obligations, duties, or disabilities with respect to past
transactions.”81 Typically, a law is described as either procedural or
substantive with “substantive law relat[ing] to the rights and duties giving
rise to the cause of action, while procedural law is the machinery used for
carrying on the suit.”82 Procedural and remedial statutes may be applied
retroactively, while laws that provide for new penalties are substantive and
cannot be applied retroactively.83 However, it is possible for the statute to be
read in both a remedial and substantive way.84 “When a statute is . . .
75

Id.
Id.
77
Smith v. Hill, 147 N.E.2d 321, 327 (Ill. 1958).
78
Id.
79
Vaughan, 708 S.W.2d at 660.
80
Hess v. Chase Manhattan Bank, USA, N.A., 220 S.W.3d 758, 769-771 (Mo. banc
2007).
81
Id. at 769.
82
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
83
Id.
84
Id.
76
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remedial in one part while penal in another, it should be considered a
remedial statute when enforcement of the remedy is sought” and applied
retroactively, but considered “penal when enforcement of the penalty is
sought” and applied prospectively.85 Thus, while punitive damages are
remedial in nature to the plaintiff, a statute authorizing the award of punitive
damages imposes a new obligation on the defendant, creating a substantive
issue and, therefore, does not allow for retrospective application.86
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, the Missouri Western District Court of Appeals
found that the trial court erred by refusing to apply MO. REV. STAT. §
510.265.1(2).87 Therefore, because § 510.265.1(2) should have been applied,
the punitive damages should have been limited to five times the net amount
of the damages awarded to the plaintiff.88
The court noted that the legislature specified that § 510.265.1(2)’s cap
on punitive damages would apply to “all causes of action filed after August
28, 2005.”89 After the punitive damages cap became effective, the City filed
its lawsuit in November of 2005. As such, the court is required to apply the
punitive damages cap.90
The court also noted that although “it is well established the Missouri
Constitution prohibits laws that are retrospective in operation,” the Missouri
Supreme Court has not characterized a plaintiff’s right to punitive damages
as “substantive.”91 The court relied on precedent that stated, “[U]nder
Missouri law, punitive damages are remedial and a plaintiff has no vested

85

Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 771-72.
87
City of Harrisonville v. McCall Serv. Stations, No. WD 74429, 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS
192, at *2 (Mo. App. W.D. Feb. 25, 2014).
88
Id.
89
MO. REV. STAT. § 538.305 (2000). Sections 510.265 and 538.305 were both enacted as
part of H.B. 292, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. and Veto Sess. (Mo. 2000). See 2005 Mo.
Laws. 641, 647, 655. McCall, 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 192, at *57 (emphasis added).
90
Id. at *57.
91
Id. at *58-60 (quoting Klotz v. St. Anthony’s Medical Center, 311 S.W.3d 752, 759760 (Mo. 2010)); See Mo Const. art. I, sec. 13.
86
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right to such damages prior to the entry of judgment.”92 Further, according to
Vaughan, “Punitive damages are never allowable as a matter of right and
their award lies wholly within the discretion of the trier of fact.”93 The court
then concluded that punitive damages are remedial and in this case “the City
had no vested right to punitive damages at the time the 2005 statute went into
effect.”94
Therefore, the well-established rule that the Missouri Constitution
prohibits laws that are retrospective does not prevent § 510.265.1(2) from
being applied in this case because the Constitutional provision does not apply
to a statute dealing with only a remedial measure.95 The court thus reduced
the punitive damages awarded against the Fund to be in compliance with §
510.265.1(2), reducing the amount awarded to the City to $860,504.90.96
V. COMMENT
Section 538.300 states that all provisions of the new tort reform act,97
including § 510.265.1’s cap on punitive damages, “applies to all actions filed
after August 28, 2005.”98 However, “this provision makes no distinction for
cases in which the cause of action accrued prior to August 28.”99 In this case,
the constitutional challenge against retroactive legislation arose because the
92

City of Harrisonville v. McCall Serv. Stations, No. WD 74429, 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS
192, at *61 (Mo. App. W.D. Feb. 25, 2014) (quoting Vaughan, 708 S.W.2d at 660-661).
93
Id. (quoting Vaughan, 708 S.W.2d at 660).
94
McCall, 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 192, at *64-65.
95
Id. The City did argue that the statute violates its right to trial by jury and is therefore
unconstitutional. Id. at *65. However, the City failed to make this argument at any time
in the trial court and thus “where a party first challenges the constitutionality of a statute
on appeal, the issue has not been preserved for appellate review.” Id. at *67-69 (internal
quotations omitted).
96
Id. at *70-71.
97
The Tort Reform Act included sections 510.265 and 538.305, which were both enacted
as part of H.B. 393. See
H.B. 393, 2005 93rd Gen. Assemb., First Reg. Sess.; McCall, 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS
192, at *3 and *57.
98
Paul J. Passanante & Dawn M. Mefford, Anticipated Constitutional Challenges to Tort
Reform, 62 J. MO. B. 206, 211 (2006); MO. ANN. STAT. § 538.305 (West 2015)
(emphasis added).
99
Paul J. Passanante & Dawn M. Mefford, Anticipated Constitutional Challenges to Tort
Reform, 62 J. MO. B. 206, 211 (2006).
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cause of action accrued prior to August 28, 2005, but the City did not file an
action until November of 2005, after the punitive damages limitation cap
became effective.100
The Missouri Western District Court of Appeals considered itself
bound to follow the specific holding of Vaughan, “despite more general
statements in other cases which arguably point in the different
direction.”101Although Vaughan specifically addressed “whether a statute
limiting the recovery of punitive damages may be retrospectively applied to a
cause of action accruing before the statute’s enactment,” the Missouri
Supreme Court’s emphasis on punitive damages being procedural or remedial
in nature does not agree with earlier Missouri Supreme Court statements.102
In fact, Missouri courts are generally reluctant to retroactively apply newly
enacted legislation.103
Specifically, the Missouri Supreme Court has asserted that “[m]erely
to label certain consequences as substantive and others as procedural” is not
decisive of the retrospectivity question.104 Missouri law has not clearly
distinguished procedural rights from substantive rights.105 The court has
instead stated that the distinction between procedural and substantive law
“has frequently proved elusive.”106
Rather than merely labeling consequences as substantive or
procedural, the court suggests that in order to analyze whether or not
retroactivity exists, the court should be guided by the principle “than an act or
transaction, to which certain legal effects were ascribed at the time they
transpired, should not, without cogent reasons, thereafter be subject to
different set of effects which alter the rights and liabilities of the parties.”107
100

McCall, 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 192, at *57.
Id. at *64 & n.10.
102
Id. (emphasis added).
103
Cook v. Newman, 142 S.W.3d 880, 893 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004).
104
McCall, 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 192, at *63-64 (quoting State ex rel. St. Louis-San
Francisco Railway Co. v. Buder, 515 S.W.2d 409, 411 (Mo. banc 1974)).
105
PASSANANTE & MEFFORD, supra note 98, at 213.
106
State ex. rel. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co. v. Buder, 515 S.W.2d 409, 410
(Mo. banc 1974).
107
McCall, 2014 Mo. App. LEXIS 192, at *64 and *3 (quoting Buder, 515 S.W.2d at
411) (emphasis added).
101
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Further within a court’s analysis, the “notions of justice and fair play in a
particular case are always germane.”108 This language seems to blur the
distinction between substantive and procedural law even more.
The notion that punitive damages are a procedural right was
conflicted in Hess, which held that a statute authorizing the award of punitive
damages created a substantive issue and could not be applied retroactively.109
Notably, the decision in Hess is distinguishable from the instant case because
Hess involved a new statute that authorized the imposition of punitive
damages for the first time, whereas in this case punitive damages were
simply limited.110 However, other states have disregarded the distinction
between the imposition of punitive damages and the limitations of such
damages.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in Majors v. Good, held that
limitations on punitive damages constitute changes in substantive rights.111 In
a case previous to Majors, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held “statutory
increases in damage limitations are changes in substantive rights and not
mere remedial changes.”112 The Majors court thus reasoned that “[o]f no less
effect are the statutory limitations on all recoverable damages.”113
Concluding that the amendment limiting punitive damages should be applied
prospectively only because “[l]imitations on damages, whether actual or
punitive, can constitute changes in substantive rights.”114
The Supreme Court of Florida also held that limitations on punitive
damages constitute changes in substantive rights.115 In Alamo Rent-A-Car v.
Mancusi, the Florida court considered the issue of retroactivity regarding a
cause of action that accrued before the enactment of a statute limiting
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punitive damages but was filed after the statute was in place.116 The court
ultimately found that a punitive damages cap did not apply retroactively to a
cause of action even though the cause of action was filed after the effective
date of the cap.117 Florida’s punitive damages limitation statute, section
768.73(1)(a), was enacted by the legislature in 1986 and “applies only to
causes of action arising on or after July 1, 1986, and does not apply to any
cause of action arising before that date.”118 In Alamo, the cause of action
arose in September 1986.119 However, Alamo involved misconduct in
commercial transactions, and the punitive damages cap did not include
“misconduct in commercial transactions” language when it was first
enacted.120 Instead, an amendment was added to include such misconduct,
but the amendment did not become effective until October 1, 1987.121 One
day after this amendment became effective; the plaintiff filed the cause of
action.122
The Florida Supreme Court examined whether the amendment was
one of substantive or procedural law in order to determine whether the
amendment applied to the cause of action.123 In its analysis, the court laid out
the differences between substantive and procedural law124 by stating that
“substantive law prescribes duties and rights and procedural law concerns the
means and methods to apply and enforce those duties and rights.”125
Following this rationale, the court found that the punitive damages cap is
substantive rather than procedural, thus the amendment to the punitive
damages cap did not apply retroactively.126 The court further stated, “punitive
damages are assessed not as compensation to an injured party but as
punishment against the wrongdoer.”127 Consequently, the court determined
that the establishment or elimination of a punitive damages claim “is clearly a
116
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substantive, rather than procedural, decision of the legislature because such a
decision does, in fact, grant or eliminate a right or entitlement.”128
Ohio case law also supports applying limitations on punitive damages
only prospectively.129 In a case in the Ohio Court of Appeals, the court held
that it could not apply a punitive damages cap to “causes of action that arose
before the statute’s effective date even if some of the conduct giving rise to
the cause of action occurred after the effective date.”130 In Blair, the cause of
action accrued starting in 2001.131 The punitive damages cap in R.C.
2315.21(D) became effective on April 7, 2005.132 The lawsuit was filed in
September 2005.133 Therefore, the court found “the current version of R.C.
2315.21 could not have been applied retroactively to that conduct.”134 Thus,
the Ohio court stressed the importance of the timing of the conduct, which
warranted claims for punitive damages in relation to the enactment of
punitive damages cap, rather than focusing on when the cause of action was
filed.
The Supreme Court of Alabama also examined when the cause of
action accrued in relation to the application of the punitive damages cap.135
Alabama’s cap on punitive damages under Alabama Code 1975 § 6-11-20
specifically provides that the cap “does not apply to a plaintiff whose cause
of action accrued prior to the date the act became effective — June 11,
1987.”136 Thus, the court found that because the plaintiff’s “cause of action
accrued prior to that date . . . her recovery is not limited by this cap.”137
Georgia’s punitive damages limitation also provides language that
determines applicability by when the cause of action accrued, rather than
when it was filed. Section 51-12-5.1(h) provides, “[t]his Code section shall
128
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apply only to causes of action arising on or after April 14, 1997.”138 In
Scriver v. Lister, the Georgia Court of Appeals found no error in the trial
court’s award of punitive damages when the trial court refused to
retroactively apply a cap on punitive damages.139 The court upheld the trial
court’s finding that “the cause of action in this case arose from [the
defendant’s] actions in 1985 and 1986; therefore, this case is not subject to
the current . . . cap on punitive damage awards.”140
The Supreme Court of Montana is yet another state that has held
limitations on punitive damages does not apply retroactively.141 In Murphy
Homes, Inc. v. Mueller, all of the relevant events in the case, including the
filing of the lawsuit, took place before the amendment limiting punitive
damages was in effect.142 However, the timing of the filing still did not seem
to affect the court’s reasoning. Instead, the court simply looked to Montana
law, which provides that “[n]o law contained in any of the statutes of
Montana is retroactive unless expressly so declared.”143 Thus, the court held
the statutory limitation on punitive damages did not apply.144
A number of states have implemented statutes similar to MO. REV.
STAT. § 510.265.1, limiting the amount of recovery for punitive damages.145
However, within these states there is limited case law regarding the issue of
retroactively applying such limitations on causes of action that were filed
after the enactment date of the punitive damages cap but accrued prior to the
date of enactment.
Under the Missouri Constitution, it is a general rule that statutes are
not applied retroactively.146 However, the Missouri Western District Court of
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Appeals in this case followed the reasoning of Vaughan, allowing for the
statute limiting punitive damages to be applied retroactively.147 The court
merely labeled limitations of punitive damages as remedial and determined
the City had no vested right to such damages prior to the entry of
judgment,148 even though the Missouri Supreme Court asserted that merely
labeling consequences is not decisive of retrospectivity.149 The Western
District Court of Appeals seemed to ignore the principle that “an act or
transaction, to which certain legal effects were ascribed at the time they
transpired, should not . . . be subject to different set of effects which alter the
rights and liabilities of the parties.”150 Here, the punitive damages cap altered
the liability of the Fund.
Additionally, in Vaughan, the Missouri Supreme Court stated punitive
damages are awarded wholly within the discretion of the trier of fact.151 Here,
the trier of fact acted within its discretion and gave a punitive damages award
to the City. However, this award was retroactively limited by the legislature,
simply because the City filed their claim after the statute was enacted even
though the harm relating to the cause of action accrued prior to that date.
This seems counterintuitive to the “notions of justice and fair play.” Missouri
has blurred the distinction between substantive and procedural law by this
language and by its holding in Hess.
In Majors v. Good, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held similarly to
Hess, finding that the increases in damage limitations are changes in
substantive rights and not mere remedial changes.152 However, instead of
attempting to make a distinction between increases and limitations on
punitive damages or reading the statute in such a way that it is both remedial
and substantive, Oklahoma held all limitations on damages, whether actual or
punitive, are substantive and should only be applied prospectively.153
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The Supreme Court of Florida, like the Supreme Court of Missouri,
also examined whether a law is substantive or procedural in order to
determine whether the law applied to the cause of action. The Florida
Supreme Court stated the difference is that “substantive law prescribes duties
and rights and procedural law concerns the means and methods to apply and
enforce those duties and rights.”154 The Missouri Supreme Court stated the
difference is that a substantive law “relates to rights and duties giving rise to
the cause of action, while procedural statutes supply the machinery used to
effect the suit.”155 Both courts use essentially the exact same language when
describing the difference between substantive and procedural law. Further,
the Florida Supreme Court stated “punitive damages are assessed not as
compensation to an injured party but as punishment against the
wrongdoer.”156 The Missouri Supreme Court stated “the purpose of punitive
damages is to inflict punishment and to serve as an example and deterrent to
similar conduct.”157 Like in Alamo, where the punitive damages limitation
statue affected a substantive law and where the plaintiff filed suit after the
limitation was enacted, Missouri’s punitive damages limitation affected a
substantive law. Therefore, this limitation should not be applied retroactively,
regardless of the fact that the City filed after the statute’s enactment date.158
Like in the Ohio case, Blair v. McDonagh, where the cause of action
accrued before the statute’s effective date, but was filed after the enactment
of the statute, here the cause of action against the Fund accrued before the
statute’s effective date.159 The Fund made fraudulent and negligent
misrepresentations to the City during the negotiations in which Vuchetich,
representing the Fund, convinced the City to leave the contaminated soil in
place and substitute petroleum-resistant piping. These misrepresentations
continued and were clearly evidenced by the testimony of individuals at the
April 15, 2004 meeting. Further, on August 4, 2004, the City's attorney sent a
letter to Vuchetich stating that the City was going forward in reliance on his
promise that the Fund would pay the full amount of Midwest Remediation’s
costs, and the Fund still did not reimburse the City for Midwest
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Remediation’s work. Although the City did not file this action until
September of 2015, the cause of action still accrued before the effective date
of the statute and therefore “could not have applied retroactively to that
conduct.”160
Further, in both Alabama and Georgia, the punitive damages cap’s
application is determined by when the cause of action accrued rather than
was filed.161 Like the Georgia Court of Appeals, the court here should have
found no error in the trial court’s award of punitive damages when the trial
court refused to retroactively apply the punitive damages cap.
VI. CONCLUSION
Retroactively applying the statutory cap on punitive damages,
imposed by MO. REV. STAT. § 510.265, raises the issue of whether this
application violates the Missouri Constitution. In City of Harrisonville v.
McCall Serv. Stations, the Missouri Western District Court of Appeals
allowed for retroactive application because it deemed the statutory cap on
punitive damages as a procedural issue and not one of substantive law. With
this decision, Missouri follows some historical decisions while seeming to go
against others. Further, Missouri departs from rulings of other states that
apply statutory caps on punitive damages prospectively. The Missouri
Supreme Court recently ordered the cause transferred on September 30, 2014,
so it remains to be seen if Missouri will take the side of the defendants and
continue to protect defendants by retroactively applying limitations on
punitive damages.
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